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ABSTRACT
The feasibility of using field-portable prompt gamma-ray neutron 
activation analysis (PGNAA) to detect and identify explosives in improvised 
nuclear devices has been studied computationally, using the Monte Carlo N-
Particle (MCNP) code developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The Monte 
Carlo results, in turn were tested experimentally using explosive simulants and 
the PINS PGNAA system developed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The 
results of the MCNP calculations and PINS measurements have been previously 
reported1.  In this report we describe measurements performed on actual 
explosives and compare the results with calculations.  
The calculations and measurements were in good agreement and indicate 
that most explosives are readily distinguishable from one another by PGNAA.
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1Explosive Detection and Identification by PGNAA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In FY-2003, DOE/NA-42 officials asked us if INL’s Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy 
System2 (PINS) could be adapted to detect and identify explosives, if any, within a suspect improvised 
nuclear device (IND).  In 2004 we reported the results of Monte Carlo calculations and a small set of 
laboratory experiments to confirm the results.  We report here our FY-2005 study of this problem.  Our 
work consisted of a set of laboratory experiments on actual explosives and a small set of calculations 
using Los Alamos National Laboratory's MCNP3 code. 
PINS employs neutron radiation to probe the chemical elements within a container without the 
need to open or even touch the container. A radoisotopic neutron source or an electrical neutron generator 
shines neutrons on the item under test. The neutrons, in turn, penetrate the container or munition where 
they interact with the atomic nuclei of the filler material, producing gamma rays characteristic of the 
chemical elements inside the item. These energetic gamma rays can penetrate even the thick steel wall of 
an artillery projectile to escape and trigger a gamma-ray spectrometer. This technique is called Prompt 
Gamma-ray Neutron Activation Analysis (PGNAA). A schematic neutron reaction event is shown in 
Figure 1. The energies and intensities of these gamma rays, as measured by the spectrometer, identify the 
elemental composition of the fill material. 
Figure 1. Schematic neutron interaction. 
PGNAA has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for identifying contents of munitions and 
other containers suspected to contain explosives, smoke-generating chemicals, and chemical warfare 
agents such as mustard and nerve gas, and to this end, PINS is used routinely by the U.S. Army4, the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and foreign military units. 
2Identifying explosives of a particular type is somewhat more difficult that identifying chemical 
warfare agents, however, because most explosives contain just four chemical elements, while the 
elemental compositions of chemical warfare agents vary broadly. For example, Table 1 shows the 
compositions5,6 of the explosives examined in this project.  The chemical formulas and designations of the 
explosives are shown in Table 2. 
Table 1. Elemental Composition of Explosives in weight percent. 
 HMX LX-17 TNT Comp. B TATB PBX-9501 PBX-9502 NM ANFO 
Black 
Powder TATP 
H 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.3 2.9 2.2 5.0 5.4 -- 8.2 
C 16.2 27.5 37.0 24.3 27.9 17.7 27.6 19.7 2.6 9.3 48.6 
O 43.2 34.4 42.3 42.6 37.2 43.0 35.3 52.4 58.1 35.2 43.2 
N 37.8 30.1 18.5 30.4 32.6 36.4 31.0 23.0 33.9 10.3 -- 
Cl -- 1.9 -- -- -- -- 1.3 -- -- -- -- 
F -- 2.2 -- -- -- -- 1.4 -- -- -- -- 
S -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16.5 -- 
K -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 28.7 -- 
Table 2.  Designations and Chemical Formulas of Explosives 
Designation Chemical Formula Chemical Name 
HMX C4H8N8O8 Octahydro-1,3,5,7-tetranitro-1,3,5,7-tetrazocine 
LX-17 92.5% TATB, 7.5% Kel-F 800 (C8H2Cl3F11)n LX-17-0
TNT C7H5N3O6 2-methyl-1,3,5-trinitrobenzene 
Composition B 63% RDX (C3H6N6O6) , 36% TNT, 1% wax -- 
TATB C6H6N6O6 2,4,6-trinitro-1,3,5-benzenetriamine 
PBX-9501 95% HMX, 2.5% Estane (C5.14H7.50N0.19O1.76)n ,
2.5% BDNPA-F --
PBX-9502 95% TATB, 5% Kel-F 800 -- 
NM CH3NO2 Nitromethane
ANFO 95% Ammonium Nitrate (H4N2O3), 5% fuel oil Ammonium nitrate-fuel oil mixture 
Black Powder 75% KNO3, 15% charcoal, 10% sulfur -- 
TATP C9H18O6 Triacetonetriperoxide 
3As can be seen in the tables explosives  consist largely of the same elements (carbon, hydrogen, 
oxygen, and nitrogen) in differing ratios, the major exceptions being the chlorine-bearing explosives LX-
17 and PBX-9502, and the non-nitrogenous explosive TATP. The key therefore to explosive 
identification is in the ability to determine the relative concentrations of the key elements carbon, 
hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen.  
In order to examine the feasibility of measuring relative concentrations of these elements, the 
PGNAA process was studied using MCNP in 2004. The results of those calculations were compared with 
laboratory measurements of simulated explosives using a PINS system. 
42. PREVIOUS WORK 
The previous work in this project consisted of studying the various neutron sources, likely 
explosive types, and the response of a PGNAA system using the MCNP code.  It was determined that 
most explosives could be readily distinguished from one another if a DT neutron generator were used, as 
opposed to a DD neutron generator or 252-Californium source.  The most likely method of spectrum 
analysis was also determined, i.e. what gamma-spectrum features would be used to distinguish the various 
explosives.
It was determined in 2004 that the geometry of the explosives would not affect their identification 
if elemental ratios were used as primary means of identification.  In particular if one used the gamma-ray 
peak areas of gamma rays produced by inelastic scattering, or the ratio of two peak areas produced by 
thermal neutron capture, then the effects of explosive geometry would be minimized  The results of using 
the ratios of carbon-to-oxygen and hydrogen-to-nitrogen are shown in Figure 2.   In the figure, the ratios 
are plotted for each explosive type using three different masses, 5 kg, 10kg, and 15kg.  As can be seen, 
the explosive mass does not significantly affect the ratios.  In addition to testing different masses and 
geometric configurations of explosives, we previously examined the effects of inserting a plug of uranium 
inside a mass of explosives and determined that there were no appreciable changes in the elemental ratios. 
Figure 2. Explosive elemental ratios. 
In order to compare with calculation, a short series of measurements were performed on explosive 
simulants of HMX, LX-17, and COMP. B.  The simulants were composed of innocuous materials such as 
melamine, graphite and salt in order to obtain elemental compositions close to that of the actual 
explosives. The densities of the simulants were significantly lower than the actual explosives however, on 
the order of 1.0 g/cc as opposed to 1.9 g/cc.  The results of the measurements and the MCNP calculations 
5are shown in Figure 3.  As can be seen in the figure, there was good agreement between the measurement 
and the calculation. 
Figure 3. Measured results compared with MCNP.
63. PINS MEASUREMENTS AND COMPARISON WITH MCNP 
The current work consisted of a series of measurements and calculations on actual explosives.  The 
explosives anfo, composition B, C-4, PBX-9501, and PBX-9502 were examined both in the laboratory 
and in simulation.  The geometry for the calculations and measurements is shown in Figure 4.  The 
apparatus consisted of the following: 
x Ortec GMX 45% HPGe detector 
x Ortec Digidart Multichannel Analyzer 
x Sodern Genie 16C Field Portable DT Neutron Generator 
x Panasonic Toughbook laptop computer 
x Detector stand,  polyethylene moderator block, and shielding 
All of the equipment used in the experiment was field portable.  The digidart and notebook 
computer can be run on battery power, and the neutron generator uses a 12V power supply (vehicle 
cigarette lighter).
Figure 4:  Geometry for calculations and measurement 
7 Approximately 15-kg of each explosive was used.  Gamma-ray spectra were measured for each 
explosive and peak area information was extracted to determine the elemental ratios.  The gamma-ray 
peak information for each explosive is shown in Appendix A.   A plot of the measured hydrogen-to-
nitrogen versus carbon-to-oxygen ratios is shown in Figure 6.  These data are also shown in Table 3.  The 
measured data in the table have been normalized to the model results in order to account for detector 
efficiency. 
Figure 5:  Measured versus calculated elemental ratios 
8Table 3:  Elemental ratios 
 C/O-Model C/O measured H/N Model H/N measured Cl detected? 
Anfo 0.11 0.67 s .07 59.53 57.0 s  2.7 No
C-4 1.03 0.56 s .04 48.79 27.9 s 1.4 No
Comp B. 1.07 1.29 s .07 35.26 37.2 s4.4 No
PBX-9501 0.78 0.94 s .06 31.37 32.6 s3.8 No
PBX-9502 1.45 1.13 s .06 30.96  35.9 s4.0 Yes
 As can be seen there is general agreement between the MCNP calculations and the measurements 
with the exception of C-4.  Both the hydrogen-to-nitrogen and carbon-to-oxygen ratios for C-4 differ 
significantly between calculation and experiment.  The most likely cause of this is a deviation between 
the formulation of the explosive in the model and the experiment.  Indeed, the explosive labeled “C-4” is 
granular in form, and it does not have the consistency of modeling clay familiar to one of the authors from 
his days in the Army. 
 Unlike the other explosives used in these measurements, PBX-9502 uses chlorine-containing Kel-
F as a binder.  It should be noted that chlorine was detected in the PBX-9502 measurement, helping to 
distinguish it from the other explosives. 
94. FUTURE WORK 
The study reported here shows that the PGNAA technique is very suitable for determining the type 
of explosive found in an improvised nuclear device.  Future work will optimize details of both the 
measurement techniques and analysis of the gamma spectra and includes the following: 
x A larger set of measurements on real explosives is needed, allowing a statistical 
interpretation of future measurement, providing a confidence level on a given 
measurement. 
x Additional explosive types such as TNT and dynamite will be measured, now that they are 
available at INL. 
x The data acquisition software will be integrated with a new user interface showing the 
results of a particular measurement.  A proposed set of interface screens is shown in Figure 
7.  In the figure, as the data acquisition progresses, the hydrogen-to-nitrogen and carbon-
to-oxygen bands on the screen narrow and darken, until they converge on the most likely 
explosive type.  This data acquisition and analysis package will be designed to be operated 
by technicians. 
x Once the software has been optimized we intend to perform a series of blind tests on actual 
explosives.  The equipment would be operated by military personnel, and a variety of 
explosive types and sizes would be examined.  Data would be interpreted online, and later 
undergo an “expert” analysis offline in order to test the analysis algorithms 
.
1Figure 6:  Notional explosive analysis graphical user interface screens
15. CONCLUSIONS 
The use of the PGNAA techniques to measure elemental ratios allows a large degree of 
discrimination among various types of explosives.   The ratios of hydrogen-to-nitrogen and carbon-to-
oxygen allow one to distinguish between different explosive types and the detection of other elements, 
such as chlorine in the case of PBX-9502, allow further discrimination. There is some discrepancy 
between the MCNP calculations and the measurements, but additional measurements of the real 
explosives will allow a database to be developed that will aid in the identification of real explosives, and 
provide a confidence level in the results of a given measurement. 
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